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ARE THERE UNDERSTANDING-ASSENT LINKS?1
ABSTRACT: It is commonly held that there are internal links
between understanding and assent such that being semantically
competent with an expression requires accepting certain sen-
tences as true. The paper discusses a recent challenge to this con-
ception of semantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson
(2007). According to Williamson there are no understanding-
assent links of the suggested sort, no internal connection between
semantic competence and belief. I suggest that Williamson is
quite right to question the claim that being semantically com-
petent with an expression e requires accepting a certain sentence
S as true. However, Williamson does not merely wish to reject
this version of the understanding-assent view, but the very idea
that the connection with belief provides constitutive constraints
on linguistic understanding and concept possession. This further
move, I argue, is very problematic. Giving a plausible account of
semantic competence requires accepting that there are constitu-
tive links between understanding and assent, although these links
should be construed holistically rather than atomistically.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is much disputed what I know when I know a language. Is knowledge
of language a form of ‘knowledge that’, as cognitivists would have it,
or does it reduce to knowing how? A common objection to cognitivism
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is that it, implausibly, requires the speaker to have a rich set of beliefs
about the semantics (and syntax) of her language, i.e. a set of meta-
beliefs. If knowledge of language is a mere ability, by contrast, no such
requirement is involved—the speaker could, as it were, be ‘ignorant’ of
her own language.2 Proponents of both camps, however, tend to agree
that there is another sense in which knowledge of language, linguis-
tic understanding, involves belief: Being semantically competent with
an expression involves accepting certain sentences as true, it involves
having certain (object-level) beliefs. This, it is held, is constitutive of
semantic competence, of understanding. Hence, if P does not accept
sentence S as true, she manifests lack of understanding of some of the
component expressions.3
In the paper I discuss a recent challenge to this conception of se-
mantic competence, posed by Timothy Williamson (2007). Williamson
characterizes the target theses as follows, one for the case of language,
the other for thought:
(UAl) Necessarily, whoever understands the sentence ‘Every vixen
is a female fox’ assents to it (73).
(UAt) Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a
female fox assents to it (74).
Both theses, according to Williamson, are false: There are no
understanding-assent links of the suggested sort, no constitutive links
between semantic competence and belief. The idea that there are such
links, Williamson argues, rests on a mistaken conception of semantic
competence. In its place we should put an alternative conception, one
that cuts the link with belief and is based on externalist considerations.
I suggest that Williamson is quite right to question theses (UAl) and
(UAt). However, it is clear from Williamson’s discussion that he does
not merely want to reject this version of the idea that there are inter-
nal links between understanding and assent (the ‘UA-thesis’, for short).
He also denies that there are understanding-assent links of any sort,
and suggests that we should reject the very idea that the connection
with belief provides constitutive constraints on linguistic understand-
ing and concept possession. This, I argue, is much more problematic.
Williamson’s own alternative account, falling back on externalist con-
siderations, cannot give a satisfactory account of semantic competence.
To give such an account, I suggest, we need to recognize that there are
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constitutive links between understanding and assent, although these
links should be construed holistically, and not along the lines of (UAl)
and (UAt).
First, some preliminary remarks. When discussing knowledge of
meaning it is helpful to start from a fairly neutral, ’minimalist’ concep-
tion of such knowledge. On this conception, P grasps the meaning m of
expression e if it is true that e means m for P. Construed this way, the
question of semantic knowledge is not distinct from the foundational
question concerning the determination of meaning: In virtue of what
facts does e mean m for P, and how is the function from these facts
to meanings to be understood? Whatever theory is adopted concern-
ing the relevant meaning determining facts (whether one opts for facts
about P’s use of e, facts about P’s causal interaction with the environ-
ment, facts about conventions, etc.), if the facts that determine that e
means m for P are in place, then P knows the meaning of e. It is then an
open question whether this knowledge should be construed as a form
of propositional knowledge or as a practical ability.
Although this minimalist conception of knowledge of meaning is
neutral with respect to the debate over cognitivism, it should be noted
that is not neutral in another respect: It presupposes that the condi-
tions for knowing the meaning of e, understanding that e means m,
coincides with the conditions for meaning m by e. According to some
theories of understanding, this is not the case. In particular, as we shall
see below, some versions of externalism imply that it may be true that
e means m for P, although P fails to (fully) understand the meaning of
e.
2. THE UNDERSTANDING-ASSENT VIEW
The claim that there are internal links between understanding and as-
sent is commonly made against the backdrop of Quine’s criticisms of
the analytic-synthetic distinction. It is granted that Quine has shown
that some conceptions of analyticity are problematic, in particular the
idea that there are truths ‘in virtue of meaning alone’, what is some-
times called metaphysical analyticity. However, it is argued, if we are
to account for semantic competence we still need to appeal to a form
of analyticity, so called epistemological analyticity.4 On this view, if P
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understands e, she must assent to a set of privileged sentences—those
that are constitutive of competence with expression e. A sentence be-
longing to this privileged set is analytic in the epistemological sense.
On the further assumption that knowledge of meaning is a priori, it
is argued, the speaker can know S a priori, without having to rely on
experiential evidence.5
The notion of assent, in this context, is that of a mental attitude,
i.e. belief. To say that there are internal links between understand-
ing and assent, therefore, is to say that there is a constitutive link be-
tween understanding, grasp of meaning, and belief. The appeal to
understanding-assent links therefore limits the scope of disagreement
in belief—a disagreement on the meaning constitutive sentences must
be construed as a disagreement in meaning (concepts). Given the fur-
ther connection between belief and sincere assertion, the link between
understanding and assent transfers to a link between understanding
and use.6 For example, a speaker who sincerely asserts ‘Not all vixens
are female foxes’ does not understand one of the component expres-
sions.7
The idea that in order to account for semantic competence it is re-
quired that we appeal to a notion of analyticity can be found already in
Grice and Strawson’s famous response to Quine.8 They give as example
a speaker, Y, who asserts the following two sentences:
(i) ‘My neighbor’s three-year-old child understands Russell’s The-
ory of Types’
(ii) ‘My neighbor’s three-year-old child is an adult’
We would respond to (i) with disbelief, they argue, but if the child were
produced and expounded the theory correctly etc. we would accept it
as true, even if amazing. However, our reaction to (ii) would be very
different. If Y insists that he is not speaking figuratively, but is making
a sincere assertion then the proper conclusion is that he just does not
know the meaning of some of the words used. According to Grice and
Strawson, this illustrates the availability of an informal explanation of
the notion of analyticity. If someone rejects a highly plausible empirical
truth we will simply disagree with him, whereas if someone rejects an
analytic truth we will not understand him, and will have to conclude
that he does not understand what he is saying.
Williamson’s criticism of (UAl) and (UAt) is also connected with the
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analyticity debate. His purpose is meta-philosophical and he sets out
to argue against the claim that philosophical truths are analytic or con-
ceptual truths. His rejection of understanding-assent links is therefore
primarily directed against epistemological conceptions of analyticity.
However, one may be a UA-theorist without committing to epis-
temological analyticity. To see this, it is important to keep clear on
the distinction between semantics and meta-semantics, or foundational
semantics. Sometimes theses such as (UAl) and (UAt) are put forth
within the context of meta-semantics, telling us something about the
determination of meaning and content. On this view, what determines
the meaning of ‘vixen’ is the fact that the speaker is disposed to assent
to a certain set of sentences where the expression is a component, such
as ‘Every vixen is a female fox’. This does not imply that ‘Every vixen
is a female fox’ expresses an analytic truth since it does not imply that
the sentence is constitutive of the meaning of ‘vixen’, just that it is con-
stitutive of grasp of this meaning. Thus, it is perfectly possible to hold
that there are understanding-assent links in the case of sentences that
are not plausible candidates for analytic truths but straightforwardly
empirical and a posteriori.9 Moreover, as long as the UA-thesis is pre-
sented as a meta-semantic thesis, it does not even follow that the sen-
tence assented to is true. It could be claimed that it is constitutive of
understanding that one assents to S, even while S is false. For instance,
it has been argued by Matti Eklund that our competence with certain
terms (such as ‘true’) requires us to be disposed to accept certain sen-
tences as true that are not in fact true.10 Another example might be
provided by the debate over vagueness, where it is commonly claimed
that it is part of one’s semantic competence with vague words to accept
the principle of tolerance—a principle everybody agrees must be false
(on pain of paradox). Also, it is quite possible to include among the
facts that serve to determine meaning the disposition to accept certain
empirical falsehoods in situations where error reliably occurs.11
However, (UAl) and (UAt) could also be employed to provide a se-
mantic theory, telling us something about the meanings of the relevant
expressions, rather than about the determination of meaning. For in-
stance, it may be held that the meaning of certain terms (such as the
logical constants and theoretical terms) is constituted by their inferen-
tial role.12 If so, there will be a direct connection with analyticity since
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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it follows that certain sentences will be constitutive of the meaning of
e: these sentences, then, will be true and they will (arguably) be such
that they can be known a priori, simply on the basis of understanding
the relevant expression.13
Although Williamson’s main target is epistemological analyticity,
it is clear that he wishes to reject both the semantic and the meta-
semantic version of the UA-thesis. He rejects inferential role seman-
tics but he also agues on the meta-semantic level, offering a version
of externalism that cuts the links between meaning and belief. In
what follows, I shall focus on the meta-semantic question, and on
Williamson’s claim that we need not assume the existence of any type
of understanding-assent links in our meta-semantics.
3. WILLIAMSON AGAINST UNDERSTANDING-ASSENT LINKS
Williamson argues against (UAl) and (UAt) by way of example. He ex-
amines cases of suggested understanding-assent links, and argues that
the links may fail and yet the speaker should be described as a perfectly
competent speaker. Thus, in response to Grice and Strawson’s example,
he suggests that a competent speaker may well believe that some three-
year olds are adults, ‘explaining away all the evidence to the contrary
by ad hoc hypotheses or conspiracy theories (many three-year-olds pre-
tend to be eighteen-year-olds in order to vote, the abnormally polluted
local water slows development, and so on) (2007: 85)’. Although we
may consider the person foolish and obviously wrong, Williamson ar-
gues, it does not follow that she is semantically incompetent.
Worrying that someone may object to this particular example,
Williamson imagines an even simpler case: an individual, Peter, who
doubts a very simple logical truth. Peter has odd views and believes
that there is a logical entailment from ‘Every F is a G’ to ‘There is at
least one F’. Since, moreover, he has been spending too much time on
the Internet he has come to believe that there are no vixens. Conse-
quently, he doubts the truth of ‘All vixens are vixens’ (86). However,
Williamson argues, Peter is a perfectly competent speaker. Hence, the
alleged links between understanding and assent do not even hold in
the case of simple logical truths.14
Williamson’s argument, notice, does not draw on the distinction
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between competence and performance.15 The claim is not that Peter’s
competence is in some sense blocked, that he is really disposed to as-
sent to S, and makes a performance error. Rather, the claim is that
Peter has no disposition whatsoever to assent to S, as a result of his
theoretical commitments (99, ff.). Peter’s failure to assent to S does
not in any way reflect on his linguistic competence since, according to
Williamson, there simply are no such links between competence and
assent in the first place.
Moreover, Williamson’s claim is not that deviant speakers display
an incomplete understanding of the meaning of e. In this respect
Williamson departs from social externalists, such as Tyler Burge, who
argue that deviant speakers should be ascribed an incomplete under-
standing of the meaning of the expression in question. Thus, Burge
stresses that when the speaker (in the actual world) asserts ‘I have
arthritis in my thigh’ he makes a conceptual error and displays an in-
complete grasp of the meaning of ‘arthritis’. Still, Burge argues, in
such a case the meaning of the word expressed should be interpreted
in accordance with the community practice. This means that although
Burge (like Williamson) questions the link between meaning determi-
nation and assent, he accepts the thesis that there are internal links
between understanding and assent. Burge does therefore not subscribe
to the minimalist conception of knowledge of language, mentioned
above: It may be true that ‘arthritis’ means arthritis for P, even though
P does not (fully) understand the meaning of ‘arthritis’. Williamson, by
contrast, rejects the appeal to incomplete understanding. The speakers
in his examples, he stresses, are experts—their understanding of the
relevant meanings is as complete as it can be: “experts themselves can
make deviant applications of words as a result of theoretical errors and
still count as fully understanding their words” (98). Moreover, he sug-
gests, even if they were not experts, there would still not be any reason
to treat them any differently and ascribe incomplete understanding to
them (99). Unlike Burge, therefore, Williamson sticks to the minimalist
conception of semantic competence.
Instead of appealing to the idea of blocked competence disposi-
tions, or the notion of incomplete understanding, Williamson appeals
to Quine’s epistemological holism. The epistemological status of one’s
beliefs, Williamson suggests, depends on its position in a larger net-
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work of beliefs. This implies that there can be no ‘litmus test’ for un-
derstanding, since someone could fail it and yet count as being seman-
tically competent in virtue of her overall use with the term. Thus, de-
viances at one point can be compensated for by conservatism on others:
‘Epistemological holism explains how unorthodoxy at one point can be
compensated for by orthodoxy on many others’ (2007:91).
Williamson’s challenge to (UAl) and (UAT) should, I believe, be
taken seriously. There is a strong intuition, in the cases described, that
the speaker in question does not manifest any kind of linguistic incom-
petence. The speakers are generally competent, and their disagree-
ment is limited in the sense that it does not spread to large bodies
of related belief and does not prevent communication.16 For instance,
the speaker who claims that the neighbor’s three-year old is an adult
could still use ‘adult’ in perfectly standard ways otherwise (holding that
in the overwhelming majority of cases three-year olds are not adults,
etc.). It is simply implausible to insist that such isolated disagreements
must involve semantic incompetence. This much we have learned from
Quine.17 Moreover, to fall back on the notion of ‘blocked competence’
seems perfectly ad hoc, since there is no evidence that the speaker has
the relevant disposition in the first place, for instance, that Peter has
the disposition to accept ‘Every vixen is a female fox’.
Similarly, I think Williamson is quite right to reject the appeal to in-
complete understanding. As noted above, the idea that speakers have
incomplete understanding of the meaning of their words (the concepts
expressed) requires that we reject the minimalist conception of seman-
tic competence, separating the conditions of meaning m by e from the
conditions of understanding e. To sustain such a separation one would
have to explain what is required for full understanding, beyond simply
meaning m by e, and it is not clear how this is to be done.18 Moreover,
even if one accepts that there is some such distinction, and that there
are cases of incomplete understanding, the question remains whether
this is plausible in the cases under consideration. Just as we should be
skeptical of the suggestion that isolated disagreements entail semantic
incompetence, we should be skeptical of the suggestion that speakers
who disagree with the community on single points (for instance, on
the truth of the sentence ‘Arthritis afflicts the joints only’) should be
described as having incomplete understanding of meaning (or, for that
Vol. 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge
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matter, as using the word with a non-standard meaning).19 Every such
deviance can be made sense of against the larger background of the
speaker’s beliefs and need not entail lack of understanding.
The question is where this leaves us. Assuming that the simple
understanding-assent view fails, what should we put in its place? After
all, as Williamson notes, it cannot be denied that there is a distinction
between understanding a word and not understanding it (126). As-
suming the minimal view of semantic competence, again, this is just
to say that we should be able to distinguish the case where P means
m by e from the case where P does not mean m by e. Of course, there
may be indeterminacies, and even when there is not we may be a long
way from formulating a complete meta-semantic theory. However, if
Williamson’s rejection of the meta-semantic UA-thesis is to carry con-
viction, we need to be given some reasons to believe that semantic
competence can be accounted for without appealing to understanding-
assent links.
4. THE ALTERNATIVE?
One option would be to provide a modified (UA)-thesis, one that does
not commit us to (UAl) and (UAt). Williamson, however, does not con-
sider this option.20 Instead, he appeals to a form of externalism, one
that does not depend on the idea that there is a constitutive connec-
tion of any sort between meaning and belief. Semantic externalism, he
suggests, explains how deviant speakers ‘can still use the terms with
their normal public sense’ (91). What is required is merely ‘enough
connection in use’ between the speakers—if this goes missing, there is
no understanding. Failure of understanding, thus, consists in a failure
to causally interact with the social practice: “One can lack understand-
ing of a word through lack of causal interaction with the social practice
of using that word, or through interaction too superficial to permit suf-
ficiently fluent engagement in the practice” (126).
However, it is unclear how this appeal to the causal interaction
with the community can provide an answer to the question of what it
is to understand the meaning of a word, to be semantically competent.
Of course, if P does not understand the community language, then
the causal interaction with the community’s linguistic practice will be
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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rather limited. But causal interaction with the community simply does
not seem necessary for understanding the language.21 Nor does it seem
sufficient, unless, of course, the relevant interaction is that of commu-
nication, i.e. mutual understanding—but that would seem to get us no
further if we seek an account of understanding in the first place.
Moreover, the appeal to causal interaction is of no help when
it comes to illuminating concept grasp: Individuals may grasp the
same concept without ever having causally interacted with one an-
other. Williamson is fully aware of this. Sameness of concept, he
stresses, does not entail causal relatedness (127). How, then, are we
to distinguish the case where P does grasp the concept vixen from
the case where P does not? Williamson, again, rejects the appeal to
understanding-assent links and suggests a minimalist account of con-
cept grasp. On the simplest view, he says, ‘thinking a thought with
any attitude towards it suffices for grasping it’ (74). This minimalist
claim parallels the minimalist conception of semantic competence, and
it seems incontrovertible: If one thinks a thought then one grasps it.
However, we still need an explication of what it is to grasp a concept
in the first place, to think a thought with a certain content. And here,
again, the appeal to the community is of no help.
It is therefore a serious question whether Williamson’s appeal to
externalist considerations provides a viable alternative theory of se-
mantic competence and understanding, or even the outlines of such a
theory.22 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the suggested picture could be
a version of social externalism in the first place. According to standard
social externalism meaning is determined by the experts’ practice. This
means that the experts themselves cannot make deviant applications of
their words: a ‘deviant’ application would just be a case where the word
has a different meaning.23 On Williamson’s view, by contrast, experts
can make deviant applications without it following that the word has
a different meaning. What, then, determines meaning on Williamson’s
view? The idea, it seems, is that it is neither the individual’s practice,
nor the experts’, but the practice of the community as a whole. Each
individual, including the experts, uses words as words of a public lan-
guage: ‘their meanings are constitutively determined not individually
but socially, through the spectrum of linguistic activity across the com-
munity as a whole’ (2007:98).
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However, the appeal to ‘the community as a whole’ does not help.
The relevant notion of a community is that of a linguistic community,
i.e. a group of people speaking the same language. But what we
wanted to know is, precisely, when a group of people could be said
to speak the same language. Using the same words, obviously, is not
sufficient since two speakers may use the same words with different
meanings. That is, some deviances do constitute meaning disagree-
ments and Williamson does not provide any means of determining
which these are.
In fact, social externalism is normally presented as a form of UA-
theory. As noted above, Burge questions the link between meaning
determination and assent since he holds that there are cases of linguis-
tic deviances where the individual should nonetheless be interpreted
in accordance with the communal language (although, again, Burge
does suggest that in those cases the individual should be ascribed an
incomplete understanding of the expression in question). However, at
the same time Burge is careful to make clear that this only holds for
some cases and that there are deviances that are so radical that reinter-
pretation is called for. The notion of a ‘radical divergence’, on Burge’s
view, turns on the idea that there are rationality constraints on inter-
pretation, limiting acceptable disagreement in belief. For instance, he
suggests that when it comes to malapropisms and slips of the tongue,
the principle of charity requires a non-standard interpretation: The in-
dividual who sincerely claims to have been drinking orangutans for
breakfast is better interpreted as meaning orange juice by ‘orangutan’
than as using the word with its standard meaning.24 This means that
Burge’s social externalism does, after all, rest on a version of the (UA)-
thesis.
On Williamson’s version of externalism, by contrast, there is no
suggestion as to how we are to separate the case where a deviance
requires reinterpretation from a case where it does not. Since there
are no constitutive links between meaning and sincere assertions on
his view, two speakers could use the word ‘vixen’ in radically different
ways and yet both mean vixen by it. As a result, it is unclear what
the relevant meaning determining facts are and how the function from
these facts to meanings is to be understood. However, this means that
Williamson has failed to provide us any reason to think that there is a
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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viable account of semantic competence that does not depend on some
version of the UA-thesis.
In fact, in his discussion of deviant speakers Williamson himself
seems to rely on the existence of understanding-assent links. Consider
how he presents the examples of these speakers: In each case we are
told an elaborate story that explains the deviance. Thus, in response
to Grice and Strawson’s example, the person who assents to ‘My neigh-
bor’s three-year-old child is an adult’, Williamson argues that this need
not display a failure to understand the component words since P my
have some odd theory about pollution or some conspiracy theory. Sim-
ilarly, in the case of Peter, we are told about Peter’s ‘foolish’ beliefs
about universal quantification. This suggests that there is, after all,
a constitutive connection with belief, only a holistic one; it suggests
that although we cannot single out single sentences as a litmus test for
understanding, unless a plausible background story emerges such that
the ‘unorthodoxy is compensated for by orthodoxies at other points’,
the fact that P assents to S does entail failure of understanding. At
some point, the strain on belief becomes too great, making sense of the
speaker becomes too difficult, and it has to be concluded that P fails to
understand some of the expressions involved.25
Williamson claims that the need for a background story is merely
practical, it makes for ease of understanding but does not imply any in-
ternal link between understanding and belief. He grants that disagree-
ment is more fruitful against a background of extensive agreement,
but denies that this imposes any constitutive constraints: “A practi-
cal constraint on useful communication should not be confused with a
necessary condition for literal understanding” (125). But the sugges-
tion that we are dealing with a merely practical constraint sits badly
with Williamson’s overall reasoning. If the connection with belief were
merely practical and did not provide constitutive constraints of any
sort, we should be able to dispose of the background story altogether
and there would be no principled reason why the speaker could not be
‘unorthodox throughout’.
At points, Williamson suggests that we could in fact dispose of the
background story. For instance, he says that we can also imagine un-
theoretical native speakers whose patterns of assent and dissent are
just like those of deviant logicians (2007: 99). Once we allow that
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the deviant logician is a competent speaker, Willliamson suggests, we
can hardly refuse the same classification of the untheoretical, deviant
speaker as semantically competent. However, this carries little con-
viction. Imagine a speaker who walks around questioning sentences
such as ‘Every vixen is a female fox’, and related inferences, without
providing any reasons whatsoever for her deviance. Or a speaker who
assents to ‘The neighbor’s three-year old is an adult’ without appealing
to any conspiracy theory or the like to justify her claim. Is there any
inclination at all to say that such a speaker is semantically competent?
I should think not, and the reason is precisely that there is not a set of
background beliefs that allows us to make sense of the deviance.
The proper lesson of Williamson’s criticisms of (UAl) and (UAt), I
would therefore propose, is not that there are no understanding-assent
links but that the links are holistic in nature. That the understanding-
assent links may fail in any particular case does not imply that there are
no such links. On the contrary, there are strong reasons to think that
we cannot account for semantic competence without appealing to the
idea that the connection with belief provides constitutive constraints on
the determination of meaning and content. The relevant holism, thus,
is not merely epistemic holism, but semantic holism, understood as a
theory within foundational semantics. Consider Burge’s ‘orangutan’-
example. To mean orangutan by ‘orangutan’, on the holist view, P need
not hold any particular belief about orangutans, but she does need to
use the word ‘orangutan’ in such a way that interpreting her word as
meaning orangutan makes her come out as having a reasonable set of
beliefs about orangutans. The fact that the speaker assents to ‘I drink
orangutans for breakfast’, therefore, does not automatically disqualify
her as a speaker of English. She may have unusual habits (working at
a zoo) or be sorely mistaken (a quack has sold her a very expensive
miracle cure that he claims to be orangutan juice). The holism, that
is, allows for (surprising) true beliefs as well as for errors—even errors
such as those of Peter and Stephen. But when the would-be errors
are radical, and no plausible background story emerges, it should be
concluded that P does not understand the expression in the standard
way.
There is a fear commonly associated with semantic holism: that
it will undermine the very distinction that we wanted to secure, be-
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tween meaning differences and belief differences.26 It is in order to
prevent this that many have thought it necessary to appeal to a special
set of meaning constitutive sentences. However, as long as the holism is
meta-semantic the fear is unwarranted. What is required is merely that
the function from use (assent) to meaning (concepts) is construed as a
many-one function, such that several different patterns of use can de-
termine the same meanings.27 In addition, of course, we need to appeal
to a principle that maps the meaning determining facts on to meanings;
i .e. a principle that allows us to separate patterns of assent (and dis-
sent) that determine the same meaning (for instance, that ‘orangutan’
means orangutan) from patterns that determine another meaning (that
‘orangutan’ means orange juice). Although I cannot discuss this further
here, it is very likely that such a principle will have to involve ratio-
nality considerations, along the lines of the principle of charity, since
this provides a tool for separating acceptable disagreements in belief
from unacceptable ones. As noted above, this is precisely the type of
principle that Burge falls back on in order to account for the distinction
between deviances that do require reinterpretation and those that do
not.
The alternative to (UAl) and (UAt), I therefore propose, is not to
cut the link between understanding and assent but to construe it holis-
tically. This allows us to agree with Williamson that there is no litmus
test of understanding, that in every particular case we can imagine a
competent speaker who doubts the truth of S. However, the constitutive
connection with belief ensures that unless a plausible set of background
beliefs emerges, P’s use manifests lack of understanding.
Notes
1The paper is based on comments given to Tim Williamson’s Wedberg lectures in
Stockholm, April 2006, and benefited much from Williamson’s very helpful response.
Thanks also to Kathrin Glüer, Sören Häggqvist and Peter Pagin for valuable comments
on an earlier version of the paper.
2Devitt (2006).
3The two camps can agree on this but will of course give a different diagnosis of
the failure: On the cognitivist construal, the failure to assent to S reflects lack of a
certain propositional knowledge, of certain meta-beliefs, on the non-cognitivist construal
it reflects lack of the relevant knowing how (the ability to use e correctly, in accordance
with its meaning).
4For the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological analyticity see Boghos-
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sian 1996 and 1997.
5See Boghossian 1996 and 1997.
6The relation between assent construed as a mental attitude and assertion, of course,
is complex. Even if the speaker only were to make sincere assertions, and would not
make any performance errors, she may still lack a disposition to assert many things she
believes. For instance, as Williamson suggests, she may find it embarrassing to assert
trivialities such as ‘Every vixen is a female fox’ (74).
7Alternatively, assuming the minimalist conception of semantic competence, one of
the component words has a non-standard meaning in P’s language.
8Grice and Strawson 1956: 150-152.
9For instance, there is the idea that if a speaker dissents from certain very basic and
obvious empirical statements, such as ‘This is a hand’, she manifests lack of linguistic
understanding. This is a leading theme of Wittgenstein’s ‘On Certainty’ (see for example
paragraphs 52-56).
10Eklund (2002): 253. However, Eklund overstates the case, moving from the meta-
semantic claim to a semantic claim. Thus, he suggests that his account of competence
shows that a principle (a sentence or an inference) can be constitutive of meaning, with-
out being true (ibid: 256, 263). But this does not follow. Although it can be constitutive
of understanding of meaning that one accepts a false sentence, a falsity cannot be consti-
tutive of meaning.
11This presupposes that the determination relation is a many-one function, i.e. that
the relation between meaning determining facts and meanings is not an equivalence
relation. I return to this issue below.
12The two may of course be combined: i.e. one may adopt an inferentialist semantics
as well as an inferentialist meta-semantics. (This seems to be the view defended by
Boghossian 1996 and 1997.) However, the combination is optional. For instance, it
is perfectly possible to accept an inferentialist meta-semantics in combination with a
truth-conditional semantics.
13It is important to note, however, that the connection with analyticity only holds if
one accepts the assumption that there is a strict distinction between sentences that are
meaning constitutive and those that are not, in accordance with (UAl) and (UAt). An
alternative is to appeal to holistic understanding-assent links in one’s semantics, along
the lines of the cluster theory. Hence, it is possible to defend a version of the semantic
UA-thesis (and not just the meta-semantic one) without committing to analyticity.
14Williamson also tells the story of a second speaker, Stephen, who rejects ‘Every vixen
is a vixen’, since he takes ‘vixen’ to be a vague term and believes that sentences containing
vague terms have truth value gaps (2002:87).
15In contradistinction to Eklund, for instance, who suggests that when two speakers
dispute the status of a logical law they do both have the same competence dispositions.
That is, the disagreement is explained as a result of one speaker having a blocked dispo-
sition (2002: 262).
16Although to what extent this is true depends on the case. It may well be that certain
disagreements when it comes to the logical constants have more alarming consequences
than Williamson recognizes. See Boghossian (forthcoming) for a discussion of one such
case.
17See Glüer (2003) for a discussion of the implications of Quine’s belief holism for
implicit definition accounts of meaning. As Glüer stresses, the challenge posed by belief
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holism is to come up with a principled distinction between meaning-constitutive and
other sentences (2003: 52).
18It is not plausible, for instance, to suggest that full understanding requires the ability
to explicate one’s concepts. This is a meta-level ability whereas the notion of understand-
ing that we are after is a first-order ability (see Å. Wikforss (2008) for a discussion).
19See Å. Wikforss (2001).
20There is a reason for this, of course, since Williamson is primarily interested in reject-
ing epistemological analyticity which, again, depends on the truth of (UAl) and (UAt).
However, since Williamson suggests that we can dispose of all forms of (UA)-theories, it
is worth considering what the alternatives are.
21As Williamson would grant, since he explicitly denies that meaning is necessarily
determined by the social practice (2007: 125).
22See Boghossian (forthcoming) for a similar complaint.
23Burge (1986) presents an argument to show that the experts themselves can be
wrong. However, this argument is employed to show that meaning is not determined by
the community practice. Hence, the version of externalism defended is no longer social
externalism, as Burge explicitly recognizes.
241979: 90-91.Notice that the same is true in the case of Putnam. To have acquired
a word, such as ‘tiger’, one must not only be situated in the right context, one’s use
must also ‘pass muster’ (1975: 248). For one’s use to pass muster, Putnam suggests,
one must have a set of ‘stereotypical’, well entrenched, beliefs commonly associated with
the term (tigers are striped, carnivorous, etc). This, he argues, is required for mutual
understanding and meaningful communication.
25This, of course, is Davidson’s view. For instance, discussing the case of the speaker
who utters ‘There’s a hippopotamus in my refrigerator’, Davidson suggests that we may
be right to interpret him as having said that there is a hippopotamus in the refrigerator.
However, if P goes on saying that the hippopotamus is round with wrinkled skin and
makes delicious juice, Davidson argues, ‘we slip over the line where it is plausible or even
possible to say correctly that he said that there was a hippopotamus in the refrigerator’
(Davidson (1984)).
26Williamson’s appeal to externalism seems, in part, motivated by this fear. It is an
important constraint on a theory of linguistic meanings, he argues, that they can be
shared across differences in belief and externalism allows for this (2007: 97).
27For a discussion of this see Pagin (1997). Of course, if the function is many-one,
rather than an equivalence relation, a proper reduction of meaning facts to meaning
determining facts will be ruled out. However, a supervenience relation suffices for the
theory to be informative: it will tell us what meaning supervenes on, i.e. what the mean-
ing determining facts are, and how the function from these facts to meanings (contents)
is to be construed.
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